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Note
Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct for
Directors Within Benefit Corporations: Requiring
Priority of a Specific Public Benefit
Roxanne Thorelli*
Since its inception, Patagonia—one of the leading outdoor
outfitters in the United States—has been committed to reduc1
ing its environmental impact. By researching and developing
environmentally friendly materials and methods, utilizing facility resources to the fullest, and directing a portion of its profits
to social and environmental causes, Patagonia has been heavily
2
focused on sustainability issues for more than three decades.
Indeed, even its mission statement reflects this strong commitment: “Build the best product, cause no unnecessary harm,
[and] use business to inspire and implement solutions to the
3
environmental crisis.”
Until 2012, Patagonia was a traditional for-profit corporation with a strong social mission. That year, however, a new
legislative assembly bill was enacted to create the benefit cor4
poration legal entity in California. Recognizing that the benefit
corporation entity provided the legal framework necessary for it
* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2014,
University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire. I am very grateful to Professor Brett
McDonnell who provided inspiration and guidance for this Note and much insight about benefit corporations. A heartfelt thank you to my mother, Dr. Irene M. Thorelli, for spending countless hours reviewing and providing revision
suggestions. Last, thank you to all the Minnesota Law Review editors and staff
members who provided feedback throughout the writing and editing process,
particularly to Steve Owen. Copyright © 2017 by Roxanne Thorelli.
1. Company History, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/company
-history.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
2. Patagonia uses primarily recycled and reclaimed materials to create
products, consumes solar power for energy, and improves existing buildings
instead of constructing new facilities. Resource Use, PATAGONIA, http://www
.patagonia.com/resource-use.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
3. Patagonia’s Mission Statement, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia
.com/company-info.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
4. Assemb. 361, 2011–12 Cal. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
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5

to remain true to its social goals, Patagonia quickly took advantage of this new option. Today, Patagonia is likely one of the
6
most well-known benefit corporations in the United States.
Benefit corporations similar to Patagonia are for-profit and
have three distinguishing features. First, the required corporate purpose is to create a material positive impact on society
7
and the environment. Second, expanded director duties require
consideration of other non-shareholder interests as well as the
financial interest of shareholders when making corporate deci8
sions. Third, it is required to annually report the overall impact of the social and environmental performance using a cred9
ible, transparent, and independent third-party standard. Thus,
while a traditional for-profit corporation cannot fully pursue
social purposes because of duties owed to shareholders, and
while non-profit corporations cannot raise profits, benefit cor10
porations can do both. Benefit corporation directors must consider people, the planet, and profit—referred to as the “triple
11
bottom line” —as opposed to profit alone, for traditional for12
profit corporations, or just people and the planet, for non13
profit corporations.

5. See B-Lab, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/b-lab.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Benefit corporation legislation creates the legal framework
to enable mission-driven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven
through succession, capital raises, and even changes in ownership, by institutionalizing the values, culture, processes, and high standards put in place by
founding entrepreneurs.”).
6. J. Haskell Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions
with Benefit Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 486–87 (2013).
7. BILL CLARK, DRINKER, BIDDLE, & REATH LLP, MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION § 102 (2016), http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/how
-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation [hereinafter MODEL ACT] (download model legislation).
8. Id. § 301(a).
9. Id. § 401.
10. For further discussion about the different director duties between traditional for-profit, non-profit, and benefit corporations, see infra Part I.B.
11. See Timothy F. Slaper & Tanya J. Hall, The Triple Bottom Line: What
Is It and How Does It Work?, IND. BUS. REV. (Spring 2011), http://www.ibrc
.indiana.edu/ibr/2011/spring/pdfs/spring2011.pdf (defining the “triple bottom
line”).
12. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and
Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 288 (2013) (describing that traditional for-profit company benefits include making profits, although not exclusively).
13. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary
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Although Patagonia may be the biggest and most wellknown company to shift to the benefit corporation model, it is
14
certainly not the only one. Other companies find this new
model attractive in order to authenticate their status as a socially responsible entity that is accountable for its actions to
provide a materially positive impact on society and the environment. Benefit corporations have advantages for all company
shareholders and stakeholders, from reduced director liability
to expanded stockholder rights to an advantage in attracting
15
talent and increased access to private investment capital.
However, while benefit corporations may be growing in
popularity, they do not come without a set of risks and complications, specifically relating to the expanded director duties to
consider the shareholder and non-shareholder interests when
16
making corporate decisions. As many scholars have rightly
recognized, current benefit corporation legislation lacks guidance for director duties regarding how to make decisions based
17
on the divided loyalties to shareholders and stakeholders. For
Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 350–51 (2012) (distinguishing non-profit corporations and the director duties owed to stakeholders).
14. There are over 3700 registered benefit corporations in the United
States, with almost 500 in Delaware and 200 in California. N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N,
NEW YORK BENEFIT CORPORATIONS AT FIVE YEARS OLD: A LOOK BACK AND A
PEEK INTO THE FUTURE; B LAB DESCRIPTION OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS,
Westlaw 20160929P NYCBAR 19 (Sept. 19, 2016). Other known benefit corporations include: B Corp, PLUM ORGANICS, http://www.plumorganics.com/
benefit-corp (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (delivering nourishing, organic food to
young children as part of the greater societal purpose led Plum Organics, a
subsidiary of Campbell Soup Company, to reincorporate as a benefit corporation in 2013); Kickstarter Is a Benefit Corporation, KICKSTARTER, https://www
.kickstarter.com/charter?ref=hello (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (defining
Kickstarter as focused on the mission to help bring creative projects to life instead of focusing on profits, so the company reincorporated as a benefit corporation in 2015); Mission, LAUREATE EDUC., INC., http://www.laureate
.net/AboutLaureate/Mission (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (stating that Laureate
Education is the largest company to become a public benefit corporation with
over one million students at over seventy institutions in twenty-five countries); Our Business, METHOD, http://methodhome.com/beyond-the-bottle/our
-business (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (describing how Method Products reincorporated as a benefit corporation in 2013 to formally focus on sustainability).
15. Why Is Benefit Corp Right for Me?, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp
.net/businesses/why-become-benefit-corp (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
16. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a).
17. Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional
Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 170, 190 (2012) (explaining how directors need stricter
duty guidelines to be able to frame and defend their decisions); See e.g., J.
Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Cor-
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example, neither benefit corporation statutes nor state case law
address questions such as what weight directors should assign
to shareholder and non-shareholder interests and which interests fall within the protected stakeholder categories that directors must consider.
Regrettably, existing legal scholarship has failed to address this problem in a systematic way. This lack of guidance
for directors needs to be remedied, as benefit corporations are
becoming more prevalent and directors need clarity for their
responsibilities. Due to the requirement for pursuing a public
benefit, directors of benefit corporations must understand their
duties so they can fulfill their obligations to company stake18
holders and promote the greater good. Besides the directors
themselves, determining the director standard of conduct concerns legal practitioners who protect director-clients and social
activists who want benefit corporations to be accountable for
19
fulfilling their social responsibilities. With novel fiduciary duties for directors and no current case law for breach of benefit
corporation fiduciary duty or benefit corporation governance, it
20
is important to clarify director duty and provide guidance;
otherwise, the new corporate entity may ultimately prove un21
successful.
poration Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 354–55 (2014); Antony Page, New
Corporate Forms and Green Business, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
347, 364 (2013).
18. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90
Days out: Who’s Opting in?, 14 U. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 275–76 (2014) (stating
that research must continue to determine how director actions of balancing
stakeholder interests will be interpreted). Also, because corporations “exist to
create value,” it is important that directors have a clear sense of how they are
required to run a corporation and which values they are permitted to foster.
Joseph R. Shealy, The Corporate Identity Theory Dilemma: North Carolina
and the Need for Constructionist Corporate Law Reform, 94 N.C. L. REV. 686,
711 (2016).
19. Deborah J. Walker, Comment, Please Welcome the Minnesota Public
Benefit Corporation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 151, 177 (2013).
20. Christopher Lacovara, Strange Creatures: A Hybrid Approach to Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 815, 879–80
(2011).
21. Studies show that when companies “participate in stakeholderenhancing and socially responsible activities[, they] have to face negative economic consequences and often find themselves being pushed out of business.”
SHUANGGE WEN, SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LEGAL ASPECTS, PRACTICES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 88 n.45 (2013). But cf. id.
at 176 (contending that benefit corporations will gain instrumental value
through positive brand image and corporate reputation by creating socially
responsible attributes).
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This Note seeks to overcome the gap in the legal literature
by providing a novel solution that will guide benefit corporation
directors as they navigate this complicated terrain. Part I introduces the features of the benefit corporation as a new legal
entity within social enterprises as well as its history. It also describes the provisions of director duty and liability within the
Model Benefit Corporation Act (Model Act) in comparison to director duty and liability of for-profit and non-profit corporations. Part II explores and analyzes five important shortcomings of the current director duty provisions within several state
benefit corporation statutes, ultimately arguing that the specific public benefit should be required and prioritized. Part III
draws from the strengths of the Model Act and various state
benefit corporation statutes to formulate statutory text that
will provide increased guidance for directors in performing
their duties. This Note proposes an ideal statute provision by
requiring a specific public benefit, prioritizing the required specific public benefit purpose within director considerations, and
including an opt-in for a general public benefit purpose to provide clarity regarding director duties in benefit corporations.
I. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
AND DIRECTOR DUTIES
Traditional for-profit corporations are intended to pursue
22
the pecuniary interests of their shareholders. These corporations may engage in socially beneficial activities, but the activi23
ties must be measured against an overall profit motive. By
contrast, non-profit corporations pursue socially beneficial ends
generally without a view towards a profit motive for its mem24
bers. The important difference is that non-profit corporations
25
do not have shareholders who receive distributions. Between
the pursuits of traditional for-profit and non-profit corporations
26
is the benefit corporation. Benefit corporations consider the
22. Regina Robson, A New Look at Benefit Corporations: Game Theory
and Game Changer, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 501, 513 (2015) (stating how traditional
corporations are required to maximize shareholder wealth).
23. J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and Statutory
Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143, 144 (2014).
24. Id.
25. Thomas H. Boyd, Note, A Call To Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-For-Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REV. 725, 729 (1987).
26. See Laura A. Farley, Note, Knowledge Is Power: How Implementing
Affirmative Disclosures Under the JOBS Act Could Promote and Protect Benefit Corporations and Their Investors, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1507, 1508 (2015).
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social good. They are also for-profit, having shareholders who
27
obtain financial benefit from dividends. However, the shareholders recognize that producing social good might reduce prof28
itability.
This Part will introduce the benefit corporation and director duties in general. Section A will discuss the features of the
benefit corporation as a new legal entity within social enterprises, including the history of its creation through the B Lab
Organization and constituency statutes, as well as its main
three components: purpose, accountability, and transparency.
Section B will describe director duties and liability within a
traditional for-profit corporation, a non-profit corporation, and
within benefit corporations under the Model Act.
A. WHAT IS A BENEFIT CORPORATION?
As a social enterprise, benefit corporations are a mix of forprofit and non-profit corporations. While for-profit corporations
29
pursue options that maximize shareholder value, and nonprofit corporations pursue activities that benefit social purpos30
es without distributions, benefit corporations pursue social
purposes and have shareholders who receive dividends, but re31
alize that pursuing social missions may decrease profitability.
1. History of the Benefit Corporation: Born of the Social
Enterprise Movement and Constituency Statute
With the trend of supporting sustainable products and services, consumers want to make purchases from, and investors
want to invest in, corporations that recognize their impact on
32
the environment. Research suggests that sixty-eight million

27. See Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder
Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 121 (2016).
28. Callison, supra note 23, at 145.
29. Id. at 143–44.
30. Tu, supra note 27, at 156–57.
31. Jacob B. Puhl, Note, To B or Not to B: Why Ohio Should Enact Benefit
Corporation Legislation To Protect Small Businesses in Ohio Who Wish To
Make a Profit While Making a Difference, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 173, 187–88 (2014).
32. Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, ECO-OFFICIENCY, http://
www.eco-officiency.com/benefits_becoming_sustainable_business.html
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2017); see Walker, supra note 19, at 153; WILLIAM H. CLARK,
JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 2–3 (2013),
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consumers in the United States base their purchasing decisions
33
on their sense of social and environmental values. While forprofit corporations, non-profit corporations, and governmental
organizations are the first three sectors of legal entities, social
34
enterprises represent an emerging “fourth sector.” Although
“social enterprise” has been defined in many ways, this Note
will use a broader definition of “social enterprise” as an “entity
that uses commercial activity to drive revenue with the com35
mon good as its primary purpose.”
As social enterprises do not fit perfectly within the current
three sectors of legal entities, social entrepreneurs demand new
36
corporate forms to accommodate their dual goals. Benefit corporations help meet this need, as they neither adopt a “corporation-focused model that aligns corporate purpose, best interests, and fiduciary duties, nor do they adopt a fully rendered
37
stakeholder model.” Instead, benefit corporations require consideration of stakeholders along with the enforcement rights
38
given to directors and shareholders. In general, benefit corporation statutes are the “most widely adopted social enterprise
39
statute.”
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (stating that consumers prefer to purchase products and services from socially conscientious corporations).
33. Benefits of Becoming a Sutainable Business, supra note 32. The 2014
Neilsen Global Survey on Corporate Social Responsibility found that fifty-two
percent of consumers check product packaging to ensure sustainable impact
and fifty-five percent will pay extra for products and services from companies
committed to social and environmental impact. NIELSEN, DOING WELL BY DOING GOOD 2 (2014), http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/
reports-downloads/2014%20Reports/global-corporate-social-responsibility
-report-june-2014.pdf.
34. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise
Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 376–77 (2009). However, the social enterprise
movement represents a return to early United States expectations of corporate
activity before the nineteenth century. Johnson, supra note 12, at 277. Corporations were “public-serving” and incorporating was not for those companies
having a private selfish purpose. Id. Also, there was no expectation that corporations achieve private financial gain as the main goal. Id.
35. Murray, supra note 17, at 347–48.
36. Lacovara, supra note 20, at 819.
37. Johnson, supra note 12, at 293.
38. Id.
39. Murray, supra note 17, at 348. While most statutes identify this new
entity as a “benefit corporation” with either a general or specific public benefit,
some states identify them as “public benefit corporations,” “social purpose corporations,” or “sustainable business corporations.” See CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 2500 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501–509 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
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Another precursor to the benefit corporation is the permis40
sive constituency provision in state corporate statutes, which
is the oldest and most common type of progressive corporate
41
legislation. Although these statutes differ slightly by state,
they all permit directors to consider the impact a corporate ac42
tion may have on non-shareholders. Usually, these nonshareholder stakeholders consist of consumers, suppliers, em43
ployees, creditors, and the community. If a corporate decision
would harm these stakeholders, the directors may “trade-off a
reduction in shareholder gains for enhanced stakeholder wel44
fare.” Although benefit corporations can be viewed as an alternative to constituency statutes, many states are enacting
benefit corporation legislation in addition to their pre-existing
45
constituency statutes. While permissive constituency statutes
do not require directors to consider interests of constituencies
other than shareholders, benefit corporations do require the
46
consideration.
Many states have relied on the Model Act to draft their
benefit corporation legislation. The Model Act was drafted by B

8, §§ 361–368 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-1–13; WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 23B.25.005–.150 (2012). California has legislation for social purpose corporations, as well as benefit corporations. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14600–14631
(2011).
40. Sean W. Brownridge, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Unocal and the Defensive Mechanism Hidden in Corporate Benefit Purpose, 60 VILL. L. REV. 903,
931 (2015).
41. Shealy, supra note 18, at 703. Many constituency provisions in state
corporate statutes were enacted in response to takeover activity in the 1980s
as a way to protect local businesses. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 23–26
(1992). Starting in 1983 with Pennsylvania, forty-one states currently have
some form of a constituency statute. See ANDREW KEAY, THE ENLIGHTENED
SHAREHOLDER VALUE PRINCIPLE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 187 (2013);
Shealy, supra note 18, at 691. The statutes have been said to reflect arguments made by Harvard Law Professor E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930s. Id. He
stated, “The public saw companies as economic institutions that have a social
service role to play as well as making profits for shareholders.” Id.
42. Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency
Statutes Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 781–82 (2009).
43. Orts, supra note 41, at 16.
44. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 994–95 (1992). See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 8 (explaining how constituency statutes were developed as a
defense mechanism to hostile takeovers).
45. Shealy, supra note 18, at 704–05.
46. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a).
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Lab, a non-profit organization with a mission to solve social
47
and environmental issues using the power of business. B Lab
then lobbied states to pass benefit corporation statutes based
48
on the Model Act. Maryland became the first state in 2010 to
pass benefit corporation legislation, which is very similar to the
49
Model Act. Since 2010, thirty states and the District of Columbia have passed similar benefit corporation legislation, and
50
seven other states are in the process of passing legislation.
This legislation allows entrepreneurs to choose a business entity with an embedded social mission, and allows existing corpo51
rations to convert into it.
2. Three Main Components of Benefit Corporations: Purpose,
Accountability, and Transparency
Similar to traditional for-profit corporations, benefit corporations have three main components: purpose, accountability,
52
and transparency. Benefit corporations, however, have their
own distinct version of each.
First, the corporate purpose of the benefit corporation must
53
be to pursue a public benefit. Benefit corporation directors
must pursue the general public benefit and have the option to

47. Our History, B CORP., https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/
the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/our-history (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
48. Brownridge, supra note 40, at 904.
49. Walker, supra note 19, at 156.
50. State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp
.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). Italy also
adopted benefit corporation legislation, and similar national legislation is
pending in Taiwan, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Columbia. John Montgomery, Mastering the Benefit Corporation, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2016, at 1, 1–2.
51. McKenzie Holden Granum, Note, With the Emergence of Public Benefit
Corporations, Directors of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread
Cautiously, but Welcome the Opportunity To Invest in Social Enterprise, 38
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 765, 766 (2015). Thus far, only private companies have become benefit corporations; not one publicly traded company has become a benefit corporation. Id. at 767. However, Laureate Education, a private company
that is a benefit corporation, has recently filed to become a publicly traded
company. N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, supra note 14.
52. FAQ, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/faq (last visited Mar. 6,
2017).
53. James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, The Evolution of Corporations in
England and America: Benefit Corporations, in TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 2:14, at 16 (3d ed. Supp. 2015). This differs from traditional
for-profit corporations, which are allowed to form for any lawful purpose, but
do not have a required particular purpose. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
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also pursue one or more specific public benefits listed in the
54
company’s articles of incorporation. In the Model Act, a “general public benefit” is a “material positive impact on society and
the environment, taken as a whole, [assessed against a thirdparty standard,] from the business and operations of a benefit
55
corporation.” A “specific public benefit” is anything that con56
fers any particular benefit on society or the environment. The
Model Act includes seven examples of possibilities for a “specific public benefit”: (1) providing low-income communities with
beneficial products or services; (2) promoting economic opportunity for communities; (3) preserving the environment; (4) improving human health; (5) promoting the advancement of
knowledge, arts, or sciences; (6) increasing the flow of capital to
entities which benefit the environment or society; and (7) any
57
other particular benefit on society or the environment.
Whether a benefit corporation chooses to pursue a specific
public benefit has an important effect on the scope of a benefit
corporation’s operation. While the general public benefit allows
a company to create a materially positive impact on society and
the environment as a whole, creating a specific public benefit
purpose is an opportunity to concentrate on a corporation’s
unique mission and priorities. Benefit corporations pursuing
only a general public benefit have a broader commitment than
those that also select a specific public benefit. Choosing both a
general public benefit and specific public benefit allows a benefit corporation to pursue its unique, individual objectives while
58
also assuring its pursuit of broader societal goals.
State statutes may provide guidance for creating appropriate specific public benefits, but corporations will likely draft
specific language tailored for their own purposes. While the
Model Act and state statutes do not outline a level of required
specificity, a specific public benefit should be more specific than
the “material positive impact on the society and the environ59
ment” of the general public benefit requirement. While a spe-

54. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a).
55. Id. § 102.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Thomas J. White III, Note, Benefit Corporations: Increased Oversight
Through Creation of the Benefit Corporation Commission, 41 J. LEGIS. 329,
341 (2015).
59. Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: Choosing a Specific Benefit, B
LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Delaware%20Public%20Benefit%
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cific public benefit purpose should be more unique than the
general public benefit purpose, benefit corporations should create a specific public benefit with a comprehensive purpose to
60
allow for flexibility in the future. For example, if a corporation’s specific public benefit purpose is to promote innovation in
education and improve access to quality schooling, the corporation should not name specific methods regarding how the corporation will achieve that purpose, because the corporation
61
may evolve and the specific methods may change.
Second, the accountability for the director’s standard of
conduct has expanded in comparison to traditional for-profit
corporations. When making corporate decisions, directors “shall
consider the effects of any action or inaction upon” the share62
63
holders and stakeholder groups as a whole. There are six
non-shareholder stakeholders that directors must consider:
(1) company employees; (2) company customers; (3) the company’s community; (4) local and global environment; (5) shortterm and long-term interests of the company; and (6) the company’s ability to accomplish the general and specific public ben64
efit. The Model Act, however, does not provide guidance for
determining which groups may fit within these stakeholder
categories or how to accomplish the benefits. Because benefit
corporations must consider a general and an optional specific
65
public benefit, benefit corporations can pursue environmental
20Corporations_%20Choosing%20A%20Specific%20Benefit%20FINAL_6_3_0
.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Id. For instance, Patagonia’s specific public benefits exemplify a
workable balance between specificity and breadth. While Patagonia is a public
benefit corporation, it has also chosen to adopt specific public benefits, six
overall. These six specific public benefits are: (1) “1% for the [p]lanet” for yearly charitable contributions; (2) “[b]uild the best product and cause no unnecessary harm to the planet or its inhabitants”; (3) “[c]onduct [o]perations
[c]ausing [n]o [u]nnecessary [h]arm”; (4) “[s]haring [b]est [p]ractices with
[o]ther [c]ompanies”; (5) “[t]ransparency”; and (6) “[p]roviding a [s]upportive
[w]ork [e]nvironment.” PATAGONIA WORKS, ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION
REPORT 8–11 (2013), http://www.patagonia.com/on/demandware.static/Sites
-patagonia-us-Site/Library-Sites-PatagoniaShared/en_US/PDFUS/bcorp_
annual_report_2014.pdf (describing each of Patagonia’s specific public benefit
purposes).
62. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1).
63. See id. § 102 (stating that the required general public benefit purpose
is a “material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a
whole,” so directors must also consider the impact “as a whole”).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 201.
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goals even at the risk of reducing shareholder profitability. At
the same time, benefit corporation statutes generally allow
shareholders, not other stakeholders, to commence and maintain an enforcement proceeding against benefit corporation di67
rectors.
Third, the transparency of the benefit corporation requires
disclosure of an annual report addressing the impact of the social and environmental performance with reference to a credible, independent, comprehensive, and transparent third-party
68
standard. While traditional for-profit corporations also file
annual reports, the annual benefit corporation reports include
a narrative description of “the ways in which the benefit corporation pursued general public benefit during the year and the
69
extent to which general public benefit was created.” Overall,
the corporate purpose, accountability, and transparency of a
benefit corporation are distinct from those guiding a traditional
for-profit corporation.
B. GENERAL DIRECTOR DUTIES WITHIN TRADITIONAL FORPROFIT CORPORATIONS, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, AND
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
In order to understand the uniqueness of the standard of
conduct for benefit corporation directors, it is important to distinguish director duties and liability from traditional for-profit
corporations and non-profit corporations.
1. Director Duty Within Traditional For-Profit Corporations
Corporations are created under state law, and their directors are subject to standards of conduct created by state law.
Directors oversee the activities of a corporation and act on be70
half of the shareholders. While managing and directing the
66. Callison, supra note 23, at 145.
67. See Jacob E. Hasler, Note, Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations Empower Investors and Redefine Shareholder Value, 100 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1315–16 (2014). These proceedings can normally be brought for failing to
pursue or create the general public benefit or specific public benefit purpose
set forth in the articles of incorporation, or violating any obligation, duty or
standard of conduct within the statute. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 102. For
further discussion regarding benefit corporation director duty and liability, see
infra Part I.B.3.
68. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 401.
69. Id. § 401(a)(1)(i).
70. Shiva Mirzanian, Note, Washington’s Social Purpose Corporation:
Creating Accountability for Corporations or Simply Providing a Halo to Unde-
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company, directors owe certain duties—fiduciary duties—to the
71
corporation itself and to the corporation’s shareholders. State
corporate law has long recognized three basic fiduciary duties
for corporate directors: duty of loyalty, duty of care, and duty of
72
good faith. Under the duty of loyalty, directors are required to
73
pursue the best interests of the corporation and refrain from
74
using their corporate positions for personal gain. Under the
duty of care, directors must exercise good business judgment
75
and use ordinary prudence in the operation of the business.
The duty of good faith is sometimes referred to as a separate
obligation but is also a part of the duties of care and loyalty to
76
advance the best interests of the corporation.
While the director duties of loyalty, care, and good faith are
mandatory under statutory law, corporate directors also have
duties that stem from case law interpreting the duties of the
statutory law. In general, case law dictates that directors of
traditional for-profit corporations must maximize shareholder
profit when fulfilling the corporate duties of loyalty, care, and
77
good faith. Almost one hundred years ago, the Michigan Supreme Court clearly articulated this standard in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.: “A business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
78
directors are to be employed for that end . . . .” Dodge remains

serving Corporations?, 5 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 255, 260 (2015).
71. Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491,
491 (2012).
72. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)
(stating that directors have a “triad” of duties to a corporation).
73. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
74. AM. BAR. ASS’N, COMM’N ON CORP. LAWS, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S
GUIDEBOOK 1599–1600 (rev ed. 1978).
75. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008); Robert J.
Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1139, 1140–41 (2013).
76. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); Leo E.
Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 673–90 (2010) (discussing good faith under
Delaware corporate law as well as “[t]he [r]ise and [d]emise of an
[i]ndependent [d]uty of [g]ood [f ]aith”).
77. Granum, supra note 51, at 771. “Shareholder primacy” is a term used
to describe the control shareholders have over the corporation and its directors. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
277–78 (1998).
78. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).

1762

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1749

good law and the shareholder wealth maximization theory has
79
been widely upheld and accepted by courts.
However, a strict reading of shareholder wealth maximization may not represent the current state of modern corporate
80
law. The trend of corporate law is “moving away from historic
shareholder-centric values towards a more stakeholder-centric
81
approach.” No statute actually mandates shareholder wealth
82
or profit maximization, only case law.
2. Director Duty and Liability Within Non-Profit Corporations
Non-profit corporations are generally established for chari83
table or religious purposes. Non-profit corporations have a de84
fault governing structure with a board of directors, for which
the directors also generally have the fiduciary duties of care,
85
loyalty, and good faith. The three duties are similar to that of
79. In eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, the Delaware Court of
Chancery reaffirmed that corporate directors are obligated to maximize
shareholder value pursuant to their fiduciary duties. 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch.
2010). Former Chancellor Chandler stated that the directors are bound by the
standard of conduct accompanying the for-profit entity, including “acting to
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.” Id. at
34. Current Chancellor Strine states that “the corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to
maximize profits for the stockholders.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing
Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012).
80. WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 8.
81. Rugger Burke & Samuel P. Bragg, Sustainability in the Boardroom:
Reconsidering Fiduciary Duty Under Revlon in the Wake of Public Benefit
Corporation Legislation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 59, 75 (2014).
82. Jessica Chu, Note, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations
and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
155, 168 (2012); see also Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/
benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy (contending
that there is a mistaken rationale “that existing law prevents . . . directors
from considering the impact of corporate decisions on other stakeholders[ ]
[and] the environment”). See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1992) (noting that a
business corporation maximizes corporate profit and shareholder gain, but
that it must be constrained by social imperatives and might be qualified by
social needs).
83. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 13, at 350–51.
84. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
85. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 300 (AM.
LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). For a discussion about the meaning of
the three duties, see supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
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a traditional for-profit corporation director, except the nonprofit duty of loyalty requires pursuit of the corporation’s charitable purpose as opposed to the pursuit of for-profit wealth
86
maximization for shareholders. Non-profit corporate directors
also owe a duty of obedience which requires adherence to the
purposes stated in the corporation’s charter for the greater so87
88
cial good. As non-profit corporations are tax-exempt entities,
they are prohibited from making any distribution of income and
89
must re-invest any “profit” back into the corporation. Also,
90
they cannot obtain financing from investors. Without shareholders, the non-profit corporation director owes the duties only
to the entity itself.
If a director breaches a duty owed to the non-profit corporation, there are limited remedies available. The basic remedies
include director removal or corporation dissolution by the at91
torney general, or a derivative suit brought by the members,
92
other directors, or the corporation itself. Otherwise, members
must either encourage the other directors of the corporation to
sue for breach of duties on behalf of the corporation or bring the
complaint to the attorney general’s attention to bring an en93
forcement action, because members do not individually have
94
standing to sue. Overall, there are limited remedies against
86. Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Serv., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486,
503–04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
87. James Edward Harris, The Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1993: Considering the Election To Apply the New Law to Old Corporations, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 16 (1994) (describing the board’s obligation to remain faithful
to the organization’s mission and purpose).
88. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012) (listing the types of endeavors that can receive tax exemption for non-profit corporations).
89. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2(c) (1964) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended
2008).
90. Robson, supra note 22, at 520 (discussing that regulations restrict
non-profit organizations from raising capital through investors).
91. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.30 (1986) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended
2008) (stating that the members of non-profit corporations can bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation to enforce duties owed to the corporation).
92. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 13, at 405. A majority of states provide
the attorney general with the authority to police non-profit corporations. Id. at
403.
93. Brenda Boykin, Note, The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina:
Recognizing a Right to Member Derivative Suits, 63 N.C. L. REV. 999, 999
(1985). Beyond derivative suits and actions brought by attorney generals,
states have other various actions that can be brought. For example, donors can
bring suit for mismanagement of charity funds in California. See Holt v. Coll.
of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 937 (Cal. 1964).
94. See, e.g., Boykin, supra note 93, at 1008 (stating that because North
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non-profit directors who fail to achieve the corporate purpose or
other wrongful corporate governance.
3. Director Duty and Liability Within Benefit Corporations
Under the Model Act
As with traditional for-profit and non-profit corporations,
benefit corporation directors have the fiduciary duties of loyal95
ty, care, and good faith. The duties of loyalty and good faith
for benefit corporation directors are similar to those of a traditional for-profit corporation, focusing on conflict of interest is96
sues. However, the Model Act expands the duty of care from
the traditional for-profit corporation and requires directors to
consider short-term and long-term impacts of their corporate
decisions on the six non-shareholder stakeholders as well as
97
the corporation. The expansion of fiduciary duties to consider
other stakeholder interests by mandate is at the heart of what
it means to be a benefit corporation and shields benefit corpora98
tion directors from the Dodge standard. Social entrepreneurs
consider benefit corporations attractive because of these duties
requiring directors to consider the interests of the nonshareholder stakeholders.
Under the Model Act, benefit corporations must strive for a
general public benefit purpose, meaning a “material positive
99
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole . . . .”
Therefore, directors must consider all the effects “as a whole” of
the corporation on society and the environment when making
corporate decisions. Directors “shall consider the effects of any
100
action or inaction upon” the six stakeholder groups. Under
the Model Act, directors may also consider “other pertinent factors or the interests of any other group that they deem appro-

Carolina’s Nonprofit Corporation Act does not provide for member derivative
suits, members must rely on the Attorney General or the board for enforcement).
95. Page, supra note 17, at 362–64.
96. Id.
97. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1)(vi); see, e.g., William H. Clark,
Jr., The New Pennsylvania Benefit Corporation Law, 84 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 65, 67
(2013) (highlighting the inclusion of this consideration in Pennsylvania’s benefit corporation law).
98. See Burke & Bragg, supra note 81, at 74–76. For a discussion of the
Dodge shareholder profit maximization standard, see supra notes 77–79 and
accompanying text.
99. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 102.
100. Id. § 301(a)(1).
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priate,” as well as the interests referred to in the state’s con101
stituency statute. The Model Act, however, does not delineate
how the director should “consider” the interests of stakeholder
102
groups or otherwise prioritize them.
While directors are required to consider the impact of corporate decisions on six non-shareholder stakeholders, directors
do not owe a fiduciary duty to them, nor to beneficiaries of the
103
general or specific public benefits. Therefore, directors are
protected against suits brought directly by non-shareholder
stakeholders and beneficiaries of the corporate purpose. However, shareholders are permitted to bring suit on behalf of those
third parties. Shareholders, directors, investors in the parent
company of a benefit corporation subsidiary with five percent or
more equity interest, or the corporation itself are the only parties permitted to bring an action against the benefit corporation
104
or its directors. The only action permitted is a benefit enforcement proceeding, which can be brought for the “violation of
any obligation, duty, or standard of conduct,” the “failure to
pursue or create [the] public benefit[s] . . . set forth in its articles,” or the failure to consider the interests of various stake105
holders listed in the statute. However, a benefit corporation
can provide in its articles of incorporation or bylaws one or
more identified stakeholders who may also bring a benefit en106
forcement proceeding. The identified stakeholders can claim a
breach of director duties for failing to pursue or create the general or specific public benefit, but cannot allege a breach of duty
107
against the stakeholders themselves. The limited standing to
sue protects the benefit corporation from unknown liability that
108
would be a disincentive to becoming a benefit corporation.

101. Id. § 301(a)(2).
102. Id. § 301(a)(3).
103. Id. § 301(d).
104. See id. §§ 301, 305(a)–(b); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10(b)
(2016) (allowing investors owning ten percent or more of the parent company
to bring suit); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(b) (2011) (allowing investors
owning ten percent or more of the parent company to bring suit).
105. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, §§ 102, 305(a); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:18-10(a)–(b) (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13(a)–(b). A claim
of action can also be brought for failure to post benefit reports on the Internet
or to distribute paper copies. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 102.
106. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 305(b).
107. Id. § 301(d); WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at app. A at 13.
108. WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 21.
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Along with the limited claims of action permitted, the
Model Act also insulates directors through exculpation of per109
sonal liability with respect to monetary damages. The reasoning for further director insulation is to allow directors to focus
on their responsibilities and to “eliminate director fear where
110
there is no court precedent for which to quantify liability.”
Thus, directors cannot be held personally liable for a failure to
111
create, or even pursue, a general or specific public benefit.
Overall, the benefit corporation acts as a middle ground between for-profit and non-profit corporations, pursuing the social
good and providing distributions for its shareholders. Within
the overall framework, benefit corporation directors must consider the impact of corporate actions on shareholders and numerous stakeholders. While the Model Act has been adopted by
most states, many states have also created different benefit
corporation legislation. Therefore, it is important to recognize
the differences between some of the statutes and identify effective duty provisions in order to develop an ideal standard of
conduct for directors.
II. COMPARISON OF DIRECTOR DUTIES WITHIN
BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES
There is no case law interpreting the standard of conduct
for directors of benefit corporations, as they are new legal enti112
ties. Exacerbating the uncertainty of this limited guidance,
state statutes have notable differences with regards to director
standard of conduct. This Part explores the five identifiable issues with the lack of sufficient guidance for standard of conduct
for directors of benefit corporations by comparing various state
benefit corporation legislation that have problematic issues.
Section A addresses the issue of requiring or allowing a general
or specific public benefit. Section B discusses the issues of requiring directors to consider inactions as well as actions. Section C compares statutes that require directors to “consider”
stakeholder interests with statutes that require directors to
“balance” stakeholder interests. Section D debates whether directors should be required to consider the ability of the benefit
corporation to “accomplish” or simply “pursue” the public bene-

109.
110.
111.
112.

MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(c).
WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 20.
See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, §§ 301(c), 303(c).
Lacovara, supra note 20, at 826 n.32.
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fit purposes. Last, Section E critiques the number and variety
of stakeholder interests that directors must consider and suggests prioritizing those interests. As these are the five main
concerns within the standards that lack clarity, it is necessary
to identify the options that provide more guidance for directors.
A. GENERAL PUBLIC BENEFIT VS. SPECIFIC PUBLIC BENEFIT
The benefit corporation was created so directors would be
required to consider the “triple bottom line” of people, the plan113
et, and profit when making decisions. To ensure the triple
bottom line, the Model Act and many states’ acts require benefit corporations to have a general public benefit purpose to
make a material, positive impact on society and the environ114
ment as a whole. However, “[t]he mandate that a benefit corporation pursue a ‘general public benefit purpose’ is too vague
because it does not provide a practical way for directors to
115
make decisions.”
The breadth of the general public benefit and the limited
ability for stakeholders to bring an enforcement action provides
benefit corporation directors too much decision-making free116
dom. This freedom can allow director abuse and self-dealing
or irresponsible directors, more so than with traditional for117
profit corporations. Focusing on the difficulty to consider all
the stakeholders within the general public benefit, courts will
likely give the benefit corporation directors more discretion
than traditional for-profit corporation directors, thus exacerbat118
ing the above concerns. Due to the lack of specificity for director guidance, benefit corporation directors may be able to justify abusive actions by pointing to a public benefit justification or

113. See Slaper & Hall, supra note 11.
114. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 201(a); J. Haskell Murray, Corporate
Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes 1–2, 5 (Jan. 15,
2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1988556.
115. J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30 (2012).
Minnesota even requires directors of benefit corporations to consider “future
generations” within its general public benefit. MINN. STAT. § 304A.021 subdiv.
3 (2016). This could become complicated and difficult to achieve.
116. See Walker, supra note 19, at 169.
117. See J. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed:
How Benefit Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and
Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 85, 108 (2012).
118. Walker, supra note 19, at 177 (describing how courts will likely be
even more deferential to the decisions of benefit corporation directors).
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119

a private shareholder benefit justification. In this way, “multiple bottom lines” for benefit corporation directors will likely
120
result in even more reduced director liability. Therefore, the
general public benefit may be too broad for a benefit corporation to accountably pursue.
While the general public benefit may be too expansive, a
specific public benefit allows the benefit corporation a greater
chance to pursue its more tailored purpose, because directors
121
can more easily identify the objective. A specific public benefit
purpose can “also provide a more workable system of board ac122
countability.” A benefit corporation may be more successful in
fulfilling its social purpose with a required specific public benefit that provides a clear objective, while retaining an optional
general public benefit to serve society more generally.
Some states moved in the direction of more directorial
guidance by requiring benefit corporations to choose a specific
123
public benefit purpose or purposes without requiring a gen124
eral public benefit at all. Delaware and Colorado require the
certification of incorporation to list “[one] or more specific pub125
lic benefits” to be pursued within the corporation’s purpose.
This requirement gives shareholders notice and control over
126
the mission of the public benefit corporation. The Colorado
benefit corporation drafting group believed that the focus on
the specific public benefit was “more likely to achieve the
127
shareholders’ goals” and would allow director flexibility. Also,
California and Washington’s social purpose corporations and
Minnesota’s specific public benefit corporation do not require a

119. See Murray, supra note 115, at 37 n.168 (“[S]ubtle selfishness . . . will
be easier for a manager to hide if the benefit corporation is not forced to make
its priorities clear.”).
120. See Walker, supra note 19, at 169.
121. Murray, supra note 115, at 32–33.
122. Id. at 33.
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(1)(a) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 362(a)(1), 365 (a) (2016).
124. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503 (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 362(a) (2016); see also Callison, supra note 23, at 155, 157 (“Delaware . . . eschews the ‘general public benefit’ requirement in favor of specific public benefits . . . .”).
125. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(1)(a) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 362(a)(1) (2016).
126. Plerhoples, supra note 18, at 256.
127. Herrick K. Lidstone, Jr., The Long and Winding Road to Public Benefit Corporations in Colorado, 43 COLO. LAW. 39, 42 (2014).
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128

general public benefit. Research shows that in Minnesota,
over two-thirds of the benefit corporations are specific public
129
benefit corporations. The corporate decision of many compa130
nies to include a specific public benefit appears practical, as
requiring a specific public benefit purpose focuses the goals of
the benefit corporation and guides directors when discharging
their duties.
Because the ambiguous nature of the general public benefit
purpose can allow for director abuse, benefit corporations
131
should require a specific public benefit. However, those who
create general public benefit corporations may be looking for
the ability to consider many stakeholders. Also, research suggests that sixty-eight million United States consumers base
their purchasing decisions on their sense of social and envi132
ronmental values as a whole, so consumers may want corporations to consider a variety of stakeholders. Therefore, a
workable solution would be to allow benefit corporations an option of the general public benefit in order to focus on a specific
public benefit and allow its directors more clarity and guid133
ance.

128. Murray, supra note 114, at 1–2.
129. In 2015, thirty-six of the fifty-five Minnesotan entities that converted
or formed as benefit corporations were specific public benefit corporations. For
data on Minnesota business filings, see Search Business Filings, OFF. MINN.
SECRETARY ST., https://mblsportal.sos.state.mn.us/Business/Search. A spreadsheet compiling this data is on file with the author.
130. Statutes should yield to practicality, and legislation should follow
practicality. See Ana M. Gonzalez, Note, “Yes We Scan”: Using SEC Disclosures To Compel and Standardize Tech Companies’ Reports on Government
Requests for User Data, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1058, 1074, 1084 (2015).
131. See supra notes 114–20 and accompanying text.
132. Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, ECO-OFFICIENCY, http://
www.eco-officiency.com/benefits_becoming_sustainable_business.html
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2017).
133. Providing the general public benefit as an opt-in provision would
make it more likely for the benefit corporation to follow the specific public
benefit model, as the corporation would have to take affirmative action to opt
in to the general public benefit. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61 (2014) (discussing the behavioral
consequences of the use of a default scheme). Omission bias creates the tendency to favor inaction over action, so the default of the specific public benefit
may be more attractive. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points
and Omission Bias, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
475, 478 (1994).
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B. CONSIDER EFFECTS OF ACTION VS. CONSIDER EFFECTS OF
ACTION AND INACTION
The Model Act requires directors to consider “the effects of
134
any action or inaction” on the six groups of stakeholders. This
provision is vague as to what “inaction” means, especially in relation to each company director individually. It would be impossible for directors to be held liable for failing to consider the
impact of inactions that were not discussed. While the provision has not been interpreted, requiring consideration of unknown inactions “imposes an incalculable burden on directors
135
that cannot be taken seriously.”
To illustrate the potential problems with requiring the consideration of “inactions” under the Model Act, consider the following example: a benefit corporation produces toxic substances that run off into a nearby river—an environmental impact
that the directors must consider pursuant to the company’s
general public benefit. To stop the pollution, the directors consider building an infiltration system. The directors ultimately
decide not to build the infiltration system due to its cost. Because of its vague use of the word “inaction,” the Model Act
could require the director to consider not only the impact of
failing to build the infiltration system, but also potentially innumerable “inactions” that might not have been contemplated,
including routing the runoff water to a well or building a berm
to divert the water runoff. Thus, despite the directors never
contemplating these ideas, they may still somehow be required
to consider the impact of those “inactions.”
By contrast, the Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation Act
(Minnesota Act) requires directors to consider “the effects of
136
any proposed, contemplated, or actual conduct.” This provision only requires the directors to consider the impact of decisions they actually discussed, but did not act upon. In the water
runoff example, the Minnesota Act would require the director
to consider the impact of failing to build the infiltration system.
It would not require the directors to consider the “inaction” of
ideas never discussed, like building a well or berm. While the
two provisions may have the same intended meaning, the word134. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1) (emphasis added). Twenty-three
state statutes follow the Model Act for this provision. Murray, supra note 114,
at 1–2.
135. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1027 (2013).
136. MINN. STAT. § 304A.201 subdiv. 1 (2016).
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ing within the Minnesota Act clarifies the meaning of a possible
inaction as a proposed or contemplated action.
C. “BALANCE” STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS VS. “CONSIDER”
STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS
While directors must “consider” the effects of action or in137
action upon the six stakeholders under the Model Act, directors under the Delaware Public Benefit Corporations Act (Delaware Act) must “balance” (1) the shareholder pecuniary
interests; (2) “the best interests of those materially affected by
the corporation’s conduct”; and (3) the specific public benefit
138
listed within the certificate. While the courts have yet to clarify the meaning of “consider” and “balance” within the statutes,
there has been considerable disagreement about the meaning of
the two terms. The statutes with balancing standards do not
require any specific decision as a result, nor give greater weight
139
to one factor over other factors. “‘Balance’ could mean giving
exactly equal weight to each factor, but more likely means giv140
ing some weight to each factor.” Balancing the stakeholders
may be impossible and frustrating for directors. Also, “balance”
seems more active than “consider” because each interest must
141
receive attention. “Balance” fits the concept of the “triple bottom line” where each interest must be in balance with the oth142
ers.
On the other hand, “‘[c]onsider’ . . . only requires directors
to think about each factor and could allow directors to com143
pletely disregard a factor after considering it.” When utilizing
the term “consider,” board decisions may be accompanied by an
organized formality reciting to ensure the board “considered”
the effect of each decision on the listed stakeholders, as opposed

137. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1).
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2016). Colorado has also utilized the
balancing requirement because it is more consistent with boards of directors’
typical methods of operation. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-506(1); Lidstone,
supra note 127, at 40.
139. Lidstone, supra note 127, at 44. However, shareholders could draft the
benefit corporation articles of incorporation to be more specific or give more
weight to certain factors.
140. Murray, supra note 17, at 355–56 n.64.
141. Walker, supra note 19, at 177–78. Balancing “is arguably more onerous than” considering. Murray, supra note 17, at 355.
142. Walker, supra note 19, at 178.
143. Murray, supra note 17, at 355–56 n.64.
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144

to actually considering each stakeholder. Even though “considering” stakeholders may allow directors to bypass interests
145
completely, “consider” provides more clarity for directors to
discharge their duties. “Consider” offers more clarity because it
provides a bright-line formality for directors to follow. Directors
can “check the box” for each stakeholder as opposed to the nebulous “balancing” standard which may not truly create a balance. Benefit corporation directors should be required to “consider” the impact to stakeholders because “balance” engenders
much confusion as to the weight each stakeholder should receive.
D. “ACCOMPLISH” THE PUBLIC BENEFIT PURPOSE VS. “PURSUE”
THE PUBLIC BENEFIT PURPOSE
Under the Model Act, directors must consider the ability of
the benefit corporation to “accomplish” its public benefit pur146
pose. However, directors are required to consider the ability
of the benefit corporation to “pursue” its public benefit purpose
147
under the Minnesota Act. Although the courts have not yet
interpreted any difference in the meaning between “accomplishing” or “pursuing” the public benefit purposes, “accom148
plish” seems to be a stronger verb on its face. When “pursuing” a public benefit, directors may have the option to end the
pursuit before the public benefit has been fully achieved, while
“accomplishing” the public benefit may require the full
achievement of the public benefit.
Although the stronger language of “accomplish” should encourage directors to heed the corporate purpose when making
decisions, it imposes too high of a standard on directors. Shareholders can only bring an enforcement proceeding under the
Model Act or Minnesota Act for failure of the directors to “pur149
sue or create” the public benefits. Although it is somewhat
unclear what “pursue or create” means within the enforcement

144. Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1026.
145. Id. at 1026–27.
146. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1)(vii).
147. See MINN. STAT. § 304A.201, subdiv. 1(1)(i) (2016).
148. “Accomplish” is a stronger word, as it is a verb meaning “to succeed in
reaching” and “to bring to completion.” Accomplish, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
(2016). The verb “pursue” is defined as “to find or employ measures to obtain”
and “to engage in.” Pursue, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2016).
149. See MINN. STAT. § 304A.202, subdiv. 1(a) (2016); MODEL ACT, supra
note 7, § 305(a)(1).
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proceeding context, the standard of conduct for directors should
be to “pursue or create” the public benefit purposes in order to
be aligned with the claim that can be brought against the directors.
E. TOO MANY INTERESTS FOR DIRECTORS TO CONSIDER
WITHOUT ANY HIERARCHY OR PRIORITY
Directors of benefit corporations must attract and serve
shareholders while also having to serve the interest of multiple
stakeholders, catering to various competing interests. Because
there is no hierarchy nor prioritization of these interests in existing statutes, directors will likely disrupt the dual purpose of
benefit corporations by only pursuing some interest and ne150
glecting others. Therefore, there needs to be a solution to balance the dual purposes. Difficult required consideration of the
many stakeholders clamoring for director attention may be
clarified by the potential for a priority of certain interests.
1. Difference in Number and Variety of Stakeholders
Within most benefit corporation statutes, there are six
stakeholder groups to be considered when making corporate
decisions. The numerous stakeholder interests are clamoring
for attention. This may create a “fiduciary logjam” wherein di151
rectors are unable to choose on which factors to focus. This
makes the director decision-making process more difficult and
152
problematic. With the many factors that directors must consider under the Model Act, directors have an “impossible task,”
which may hinder their ability to make decisions and the quali153
ty of those decisions. Psychological research shows that when
faced with many alternatives, people either continuously

150. In the event that there is a conflict between a social benefit and
shareholder interest, it is likely the directors will support the shareholder interest considering the current director standard of conduct is unclear and the
shareholders vote for the directors. See Callison, supra note 117, at 109. Also,
only the shareholders can bring a claim of action against the directors. MODEL
ACT, supra note 7, § 305(b). Twenty-three state statutes follow the Model Act
for this provision. Murray, supra note 114, at 1–2.
151. See Callison, supra note 23, at 153–54 (describing the social aspects of
benefit corporation legislation as “illusory” when they conflict with private interests).
152. See id.; Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1011.
153. Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1036; see also WEN, supra note 21, at
86. (“[I]t is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the
same time.”).
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154

choose the same one or two options, or avoid and defer the de155
cision because there are too many choices. Therefore, benefit
corporation directors are likely to focus on one or two stake156
holders to the exclusion of others as a basis for decisions. Alternatively, directors might defer decision-making and be
forced to revisit the issue, thereby losing valuable opportuni157
ties. Also, “considering” an excessive number of stakeholders
may have negative effects, because directors may not be able to
158
process and compare the choices available to them. Overall,
the large number of stakeholders that directors must consider
when making corporate decisions may be overwhelming, which
is likely to lead to poorer-quality decisions.
While the Model Act and most benefit corporation statutes
list six or more stakeholder interests that directors must con159
sider when making corporate decisions, some statutes list
160
fewer stakeholders. For instance, both Hawaii and Minnesota
require benefit corporation directors to focus on only two interests. In Hawaii, these two interests are: (1) the corporation’s
ability to accomplish its specific public benefit; and (2) an ac161
tion’s effects on the shareholders. For Minnesota specific public benefit corporations, directors must consider: (1) the shareholders; and (2) the specific public benefit the corporation has
162
listed in its articles of incorporation. With this more tailored
focus, directors can presumably manage these two require154. See John R. Hauser & Birger Wernerfelt, An Evaluation Cost Model of
Consideration Sets, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 393, 404–05 (1990).
155. Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1030–31 (discussing the variety of
techniques that directors may use to avoid making a final decision for what
constituency is the most important to focus on, so the benefit corporation model may encourage the directors to shirk their duties).
156. Id. at 1033.
157. Id. at 1032.
158. Id. at 1033.
159. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a).
160. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1) (2016); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-788(A)(1) (2016). Maryland omits the short and long-term interests of
the benefit corporation and the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish
its general and specific public benefit purposes. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 (West 2016). This omission retracts a focus on
the success of the benefit corporation’s goals itself. Johnson, supra note 12, at
290.
161. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-6(a)(1) (2016).
162. Minnesota does not require the general public benefit in the specific
benefit corporation. MINN. STAT. § 304A.201, subdiv. 2 (2016); Brett H.
McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in
Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 42 (2014).
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ments more effectively than they could manage the six or more
stakeholder interests directors are provided in most other stat163
utes.
To illustrate the tailored focus of a specific public benefit
corporation, consider the following example: a company focusing on recycling and reusing products to decrease its environmental impact plans to purchase refurbished machinery for
creating products. When contemplating this purchase, a specific public benefit corporation director would be required to consider only its specific objective of recycling and reusing products to decrease environmental impact and its effect on its
shareholders. By contrast, the director of a general public benefit corporation would have to consider all six of its stakeholders,
with little guidance as to the amount of attention each stakeholder deserves. This example demonstrates how directors of
specific public benefit corporations are able to make more focused decisions, because they are not required to consider the
impact of decisions on numerous extra stakeholders. Nonetheless, specific public benefit directors are still allowed to consider other interests, but are not required to for every decision.
2. Lack of Guidance for Priority of Stakeholder Interests
Directors Must Consider
Within benefit corporation legislation, there is no hierarchy to or prioritization of the stakeholder interests that direc164
tors must consider. The Model Act and most benefit corporation statutes allow directors to give only specific stakeholders a
priority if the articles of incorporation have stated that there
165
will be prioritization. Some states have not included the pos166
sibility for stakeholder prioritization language at all. Even
the Model Act, which allows benefit corporations to select a
specific public benefit, does not give priority to the specific public benefit over the obligation to fulfill a general public bene167
fit. This may imply a rotation of interests, which can keep
shareholder wealth maximization from being the focus, but it is
163. Limiting the number of interests that directors must consider improves director focus to pursue company objectives and also keeps directors
from being liable for failing to properly juggle six stakeholder interests.
164. Callison, supra note 23, at 149.
165. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, §§ 102, 201(a); see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 156E, § 10(b) (2016).
166. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07 (West 2011).
167. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 201(b).
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168

not clear. However, it does not prevent one or two of the
stakeholders from dominating the corporation’s activities so
169
long as each stakeholder is occasionally a main focus. This
could reduce the pursuit of the social purposes and disappoint
170
the investor, consumer, or founder.
Without any established priority or weight of factors for directors to consider, it is unlikely courts will be able to support
171
director accountability. No litigation has been reported thus
far involving benefit corporations, likely due to the new nature
of the entities, most of the entities being small, and most being
172
closely held. Therefore, it is unclear how courts may react.
However, courts may invoke the canon of statutory interpretation and decide that a specific purpose controls over a general
173
purpose requirement. The top priority may be the specific
benefit by default, so it would be helpful and practical to prioritize the specific public benefit. Requiring a priority of the specific public benefit may provide more guidance for effective di174
and may allow shareholders and
rector decision-making
175
courts more accountability for directors. Also, a required priority will help focus director decisions on the corporation’s specific public benefit purpose. Last, a priority will provide further
176
transparency to the board’s decision making and can provide
177
weightings for the costs and benefits of any decision.
In sum, there are five distinct ways that director duties
under benefit corporation statutes can be clarified. These consist of requiring: (1) a specific public benefit with an option to
adopt the general public benefit instead of requiring only the
vague general public benefit; (2) consideration of proposed, con168. Walker, supra note 19, at 169.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Murray, supra note 17, at 365–66. However, it is possible that benefit
corporation law may lead to norms that will deter directors from using social
enterprises to further their own causes instead of the general interests of society. Id.
172. Id. at 366 n.117.
173. Id. at 357. It is likely that the specific interests and specific benefits
take precedent over the general interests and general benefits. Callison, supra
note 23, at 159; see Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin
Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944) (stating that specific terms in a statute
control over general terms).
174. Murray, supra note 17, at 356; see also Murray, supra note 6, at 507.
175. Murray, supra note 115, at 33.
176. Lidstone, supra note 127, at 40.
177. Murray, supra note 115, at 29.
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templated, and actual actions instead of infinite unknown actions; (3) directors to “consider” the impact to stakeholders for a
bright-line standard as opposed to “balance” stakeholders with
unclear weight; (4) directors to “pursue or create” benefit purposes to align with enforcement proceeding requirements; and
(5) a prioritized specific public benefit for a focused objective.
These five clarifications will provide much-needed guidance for
directors by decreasing the uncertainty surrounding their
standard of conduct.
III. PROPOSED STATUTE TO INCREASE GUIDANCE AND
CLARITY FOR STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR DIRECTORS
OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
States can improve benefit corporation legislation by including provisions that address the standard of conduct for di178
rectors. This Part proposes specific statutory language that
will clarify benefit corporation standard of conduct within Section A. Specifically, the statutory language clarifies the standard of conduct by imposing these three main components:
(1) mandatory specific public benefit; (2) required priority of the
specific public benefit; and (3) opt-in for the general public benefit. Section B explains the policy considerations underlying the
statutory provisions. Last, Section C addresses counterarguments. By utilizing the proposed statute within this Note that
addresses five main concerns with current legislation, states
can provide clarity and guidance for standard of conduct for
benefit corporation directors.
A. PROPOSED STATUTE FOR BENEFIT CORPORATION STANDARD
OF CONDUCT
The model language below suggests the best standard of
conduct for director duty to provide clarity and director guidance based on the five main issues with the current benefit corporation legislation. The main components of the proposed so-

178. The B Lab organization, which drafted the first model language for
benefit corporation legislation, lobbies states to enact only its Model Act and
does not encourage deviation from the Model Act provisions. Callison, supra
note 23, at 164. More states should consider alternative approaches to the
Model Act in order to allow legislation to advance and find the most viable and
useful alternative. Id. Corporate law should help promote and enhance the
creation of the corporate value found within the new benefit corporation instead of limiting its expansion. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc.,
No. 01-CVS-10075, 2001 WL 1885686, at *2 (Super. Ct. N.C. Aug. 10, 2001).

1778

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1749

lution are: (1) mandatory specific public benefit; (2) required
priority of the specific public benefit; and (3) optional general
public benefit. The mandatory specific public benefit is accomplished through the language in subdivision 1(a)(1). The prioritization of the specific public benefit is accomplished through
the language in subdivision 1(b). Finally, the provision allowing
for the opt-in general public benefit is contained in the language of subdivision 2. Overall, the proposed statute provides
clarity by utilizing the most effective parts of the Model Act,
Minnesota Act, Delaware Act, and Colorado Public Benefit
Corporation Act, as well as the priority and opt-in provisions
distinct from current benefit corporation legislation.
Standard of conduct for directors.
Subdivision 1. Consideration of interests for specific
179
public benefit corporation. In discharging the duties of
their respective positions and in considering the best interests
of the benefit corporation, the board of directors, committees of
the board, and individual directors of a specific public benefit
180
corporation:
181
(a) shall consider the182effects of any proposed, contemplated, or actual action on:
(1) the
ability of the benefit corporation to pursue or
183
purpose as listed
create its specific public benefit
184
in the articles of incorporation; and
(2) the pecuniary interests of its shareholders;

179. For a full discussion of why the specific public benefit provides more
clarity and guidance for directors than the general public benefit, see supra
Part II.A.
180. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a).
181. See id. § 301(a)(1). For a discussion explaining why “consider” provides
greater clarity and guidance for directors than “balance,” see supra Part II.C.
182. See MINN. STAT. § 304A.201 (2016). For a discussion about why “action” provides greater clarity and guidance for directors than “action or inaction,” see supra Part II.B. Also, the two stakeholders listed as required for
consideration are similar to those required in the specific public benefit corporation in Minnesota: the specific public benefit and the shareholders. MINN.
STAT. §§ 304A.001–304A.301 (2016).
183. See MINN. STAT. § 304A.201, subdiv. 1(1)(i) (2016). For a discussion
about why “pursue or create” provides greater clarity and guidance for directors than “accomplish,” see supra Part II.D.
184. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(1)(a) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8
§§ 362(a)(1), 365(a) (2016). For a discussion about why a required specific public benefit provides greater clarity and guidance for directors, see supra Part
II.A.
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(b) shall give priority only to the benefit corporation’s
185
ability to pursue its specific public benefit purpose;
and
(c) may consider the effects
of any proposed, contem186
plated, or actual action on:
(1) the employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, and its suppliers;
(2) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the
specific public benefit or general public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation;
(3) community and societal factors, including those
of each community in which offices or facilities of the
benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers
are located;
(4) the local and global environment;
(5) the short-term and long-term interests of the
benefit corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term
plans and the possibility that these interests may be
best served by the continued independence of the
benefit corporation;
(6) the interests referred to in [cite constituencies
provisions of the business corporation law if it refers
to constituencies not listed above]; and
(7) other pertinent factors or the interests of any
other group that they deem appropriate which are
listed in the articles of incorporation.
Subdivision 2. Consideration of interests for general
public benefit corporation. A corporation may choose to include a provision in its articles of incorporation which specifies
that it shall consider the effects of any proposed, contemplated,
or actual action on the interests of the stakeholders listed in
subdivision 1(c). A corporation that adopts the required consideration of the interests of the stakeholders listed in subdivision
1(c) shall be named a general public benefit corporation.

185. For a discussion about why requiring a priority of the specific public
benefit provides greater clarity and guidance for directors, see supra Part
II.E.2.
186. To see where the first five proposed statute permissive stakeholders
are listed within the Model Act’s seven mandatory stakeholders list, see MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 301(a)(1)(ii)–(v). For further discussion why these
stakeholders are permissive instead of mandatory, see supra Part II.E. To see
where the last two proposed permissive stakeholders are listed within the
Model Act’s permissive stakeholders list, see MODEL ACT, supra note 7,
§ 301(a)(2)(i)–(ii).
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B. CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING PROPOSED STATUTORY
REFORM
1. Requirement of the Specific Public Benefit: Subdivision
1(a)(1)
First, the model language proposed here requires that the
benefit corporation “shall consider . . . its specific public benefit
187
purpose as listed in the articles” in subdivision 1(a)(1). The
required specific public benefit provides more guidance for directors by reinforcing the support and interest in placing an
emphasis on one cause, as opposed to the broad concept of pursuing a general public benefit which allows directors too much
188
decision-making freedom. Allowing benefit corporations to
pursue only a general public benefit as within the Model Act is
too vague and does not provide a practical way for directors to
189
make decisions.
The specific public benefit’s identifiable objective also allows better director accountability, as shareholders can point to
a more concrete goal and determine whether the directors have
190
worked towards the corporate goal. With the limited standing
to sue and limited claims of action, directors already have much
flexibility that should not be expanded with the freedom of the
general public benefit as well. Benefit corporations are favored
191
by consumers and investors because of social consciousness,
so directors should be accountable for their actions to be socially conscious.
2. Priority of the Specific Public Benefit: Subdivision 1(b)
Requiring a specific public benefit is the first step towards
a focused vision and identifiable objective, but it is not sufficient. Without a prioritization of interests, directors may not
pursue the specific public benefit zealously. This can be especially problematic considering the likelihood the directors will
seek to pursue shareholder interests at the neglect of stake187. This is similar to the Delaware Act, which requires every benefit corporation to create a specific public benefit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 362(a)
(2016).
188. Walker, supra note 19, at 169. For a full discussion of why the specific
public benefit provides more clarity and guidance for directors than the general public benefit, see supra Part II.A.
189. Murray, supra note 115, at 30.
190. See id. at 33.
191. See Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, supra note 132.
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holder interests. Therefore, the proposed priority provision is
included in subdivision 1(b) and states that the directors “shall
give priority only to the benefit corporation’s ability to pursue
its specific public benefit purpose.”
Prioritizing the specific public benefit is necessary to fully
192
focus director attention towards the company objective. With
guidance for director focus, directors will be less likely to disproportionately attend to interests that detract from the specific public benefit. Therefore, the prioritization provision will
help ensure that benefit corporations remain social enterprises
focused on creating benefit for society.
When making corporate decisions, directors may consider
the multiple stakeholders listed in the proposed statute (or
must consider the multiple stakeholders if the company optedin to the general public benefit), but would make the final decision based on the impact of the specific public benefit. For example, a benefit corporation that operates a fitness gym may
have a specific public benefit to help Americans become healthy
through physical activity and raise awareness about the importance of fitness. When determining a location to advertise
for the company, the directors discuss placing new electronic
advertisements in a neighborhood with a marsh that is not
close to a public park nor other facilities where its residents can
exercise. When contemplating the advertisement location, the
directors may consider the disruption to the environment, the
gym’s customers, the community that might not appreciate a
brightly lit advertisement near the marsh, the company employees, shareholders, the company’s short-term and long-term
interests, and the ability to pursue the benefit purposes. After
considering the impacts on all of the stakeholders, the priority
consideration would focus on pursuing the specific benefit purpose of raising awareness about physical fitness and helping
Americans become physically fit. With the prioritization provision, the directors have clearer guidance about what to do—
analyze each factor but keep the specific public benefit a priority.

192. Benefit corporations should rank or prioritize the specific benefit purpose because it is a value the benefit corporation intends to create. See First
Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 2001 WL 1885686, at
*3 (Super. Ct. N.C. Aug. 10, 2001). Ranking or prioritizing the specific benefit
helps to harmonize the corporate system to function smoothly. See id. For a
discussion about why requiring a priority of the specific public benefit provides
greater clarity and guidance for directors, see supra Part II.E.2.
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The primary thrust of the proposed statute is to encourage
directors to thoughtfully analyze each consideration and be
able to explain why they came to a conclusion, but allow them
to make the final decision based on pursuing the specific public
benefit.
3. Opt-in to the General Public Benefit: Subdivision 2
Within subdivision 1(c), specific public benefit corporation
directors “may consider” the multiple stakeholders when making corporate decisions; this creates a default of a permissive
general public benefit. Within subdivision 2, general public
benefit corporation directors “shall consider” the multiple
stakeholders when making corporate decisions. While the default is a permissive general public benefit under subdivision 1,
directors can opt-in to the required consideration of the multiple stakeholders when making company decisions under subdivision 2 by stating that requirement in the articles of incorporation. The opt-in for the required consideration of the multiple
stakeholders forces the directors to affirmatively commit to
that consideration. Creating the required consideration of the
general public benefit as an opt-out may otherwise trap unwary
benefit corporations because omission bias creates the tendency
193
to favor inaction over action.
The requirement under the Model Act for the general benefit corporation to consider the six mandatory stakeholders
194
makes the decision-making process difficult and problematic.
Some benefit corporations might regard these requirements as
so burdensome that fulfilling them hinders the company’s pursuit of its unique, specific public benefit. Therefore, strictly requiring a general public benefit, as the Model Act and other
state statutes do, does not represent the best policy.
The proposed language fixes the above policy shortcoming
by allowing benefit corporations to make the general public
benefit optional. The proposed language does so by allowing the
benefit corporation to opt-in to the required general public benefit under subdivision 2. For example, a benefit corporation
may have a specific benefit purpose of providing organic food to
children around the country and raising awareness about
healthy foods. The directors are creating an organic food deliv-

193. For a discussion of the necessity of an optional general public benefit,
see supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
194. See Loewenstein, supra note 135, at 1011.
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ery route. With a required general public benefit, the directors
would need to make many vague, additional considerations (i.e.
environmental impact from truck emissions, employee convenience of the routes and delivery time, etc.), which would complicate the effectuation of their specific public benefit—delivering
food. The opt-in provision helps prevent this dilemma, by allowing the benefit corporation to simply focus on the unique, be195
nevolent purpose of delivering organic food to kids.
By making the requirement of the general public benefit
optional, the proposed language could attract social entrepreneurs that would otherwise refrain from creating a benefit corporation because of the overwhelming requirements of the general public benefit. Because many benefit corporations already
seek a general public benefit, however, the opt-in nature of the
general public benefit in the proposed language creates a convenient option.
C. A SPECIFIC PUBLIC BENEFIT IS SUPERIOR
While the proposed statute effectively provides director
clarity and guidance lacking in current benefit corporation legislation, there are a few counterarguments against the provision. This Section will address these counterarguments and
highlight their merit, but will ultimately show that the required and prioritized specific public benefit with an opt-in
provision for the general public benefit best carries out the
purposes behind the benefit corporation.
1. Requiring a Specific Public Benefit
While the above proposed statute requires a prioritized
specific public benefit and allows for an opt-in general public
benefit, there are reasons why a general public benefit should
be required instead. Provided with the Model Act, there is a rationale for the provisions in the Model Act called “the White
196
Paper.” The White Paper lists two reasons why the benefit
corporation statutes should require the general public benefit
197
instead of the creation of one or more specific public benefits.
First, the purpose of the new corporate entity was to create
“benefit for society and the environment generally as well as
195. Providing the default as a specific public benefit corporation allows
more freedom to focus on one objective.
196. WHITE PAPER, supra note 32.
197. Id. at 21.
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198

shareholders.” While a specific public benefit creates director
clarity, corporations may not be interested in accomplishing the
specific benefit for one part of society, but concurrently creating
other problems for other parts of society like the environment
or the community. The purpose behind the creation of the benefit corporation was to create an entity that provided broad societal good. The ideal way to allow for this protection is requiring
a general public benefit purpose.
Second, the general public benefit avoids unintended consequences. The general public benefit purpose prevents abuse
of corporations from “greenwashing,” or the outward perception
199
of social responsibility. Without the general public benefit
purpose, a corporation could choose a specific public benefit
purpose and then “consider” and dismiss all other stakeholders
200
when making decisions. Therefore, benefit corporations may
take advantage of the limited required considerations. This
would undermine a main purpose of the benefit corporation leg201
islation: to create benefit for society generally.
However, the mandate that a benefit corporation pursue a
“general public benefit purpose” is too vague, because it does
202
not provide a practical way for directors to make decisions.
This vagueness can allow director abuse and self-dealing or ir203
responsible directors. Furthermore, a general public benefit
corporation might have the ability to “greenwash” more than a
specific public benefit corporation, because it is less clear what
stakeholder is the focus of the decisions. While the general public benefit may be too expansive, a benefit corporation can more

198. Id.
199. Id. at 2 (describing how marketers increasingly use certain terms like
“green,” “responsible,” and “sustainable” to describe their companies or products without standards to support the claims, thus making the terms meaningless); see also Tina H. Ho, Social Purpose Corporations: The Next Targets
for Greenwashing Practices and Crowdfunding Scams, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.
JUST. 935, 939 (2015) (contending that companies should focus on sustainability as opposed to just portraying themselves as such in order to be successful);
Lidstone, supra note 127, at 44 (discussing how critics believe that the unregulated nature may allow benefit corporations to greenwash for-profit activities
under the benefit corporation label for marketing, with little desire to actually
accomplish a public benefit).
200. WHITE PAPER, supra note 32, at 22.
201. Id. Also, requiring a specific public benefit may limit the variety of
companies forming as benefit corporations who might not want a focused public benefit purpose. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 281.
202. Murray, supra note 115, at 30.
203. Callison, supra note 117, at 108.
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easily pursue a specific public benefit because directors can
204
more easily identify the objective. A specific public benefit
would also provide a more workable system of board accounta205
bility.
Nonetheless, research suggests that sixty-eight million
United States consumers base their purchasing decisions on
206
their sense of social and environmental values as a whole, so
consumers may want corporations to consider a variety of
stakeholders. For consumer, investor and entrepreneur demand, it is important to allow the benefit corporations to include the general public benefit with the consideration of a variety of stakeholders. Therefore, the proposed statute includes
an opt-in of the general public benefit if corporations want the
required consideration of multiple stakeholders.
2. Flexibility and Judicial Development
A required specific benefit and priority may create a loss of
flexibility for the new entity form. Having too much detail creates rigid law and lacks flexibility to cope with and reflect con207
tinuing developments. If the duty provision is too narrow,
there is a danger that directors will “merely comply with the
208
letter of the law as opposed to its spirit.” On the other hand, a
general public benefit provision encourages flexibility and enables innovation by simply setting a “directional” performance
requirement of a material positive impact on society and the
environment, without creating unnecessarily prescriptive performance requirements like achieving zero waste or becoming
209
carbon neutral.
However, the general public benefit with general duty
210
terms may allow for excessive judicial development. As the
general public benefit is vague and therefore unpredictable, it
will force benefit corporations to rely on litigation to discern the
duty’s meaning. Such a situation would be harmful because lit-

204.
205.
206.
207.

Murray, supra note 115, at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, supra note 132.
LAW COMM’N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, COMPANY DIRECTORS: REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND FORMULATING A STATEMENT OF DUTIES
35 (1999).
208. Id. at 21.
209. Id.
210. See id. The general language would require interpretation by the
courts. Id. at 35.

1786

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:1749

igation is burdensome and expensive. Corporations are inconvenienced by needing to wait until courts decide how to interpret the law before the directors understand their duties. The
lack of clarity within the vague concept of the general public
benefit could give serial and aggressive litigants the opportuni211
This
ty to bring frivolous lawsuits against the company.
threat of vexatious litigation will dissuade social entrepreneurs
from creating benefit corporations. Therefore, a required general public benefit is misguided.
3. Lack of Investors for Specific Public Benefit
Generally, there is uncertainty with whether benefit corporations will be able to attract the same types of capital as tradi212
tional for-profit corporations. Critics are concerned that investors will continue to invest in traditional for-profit
corporations because they are not willing to sacrifice a portion
of their would-be profits for the greater social good, considering
benefit corporations emphasize social responsibility rather than
213
shareholder returns.
However, benefit corporations are an attractive option for
investors who are interested in turning a profit but are also
committed to investing in a company that focuses on social re214
sponsibility and the environment. The general idea is that
these companies that “do good for society” will also tend to “do
215
well in the market,” thus benefitting the state as a whole. Be211. Id.
212. See Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?,
FORBES (May 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why
-consider-a-benefit-corporation/#24ed658b6ea3 (discussing that it is unclear
how benefit corporations will impact raising capital and how angel investors
and venture capitalists will react because benefit corporations are a new legal
entity and are not yet proven to be effective).
213. See Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A
Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 657–
58 (2013) (“[I]nvestors are fully entrenched in the business and cultural norm
commonly taught in business schools—that the purpose of the corporation is to
maximize shareholder wealth.”).
214. Shealy, supra note 18, at 708. Bill Campbell, co-founder of Portlandbased Equilibrium Capital, argues that benefit corporations will become more
profitable over the long term as they pursue public benefit policies that, for
example, attract better employees. Jeff Mapes, Oregon Businesses Show
Strong Support for New Law Allowing Benefit Corporations, OREGONIAN (Jan.
2, 2014), http://www.oregonlive.com/mapes/index.ssf/2014/01/Oregon_
businesses_show_strong.html.
215. Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 103
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cause this corporate form explicitly includes philanthropy as a
component of the board of directors’ considerations, potential
investors who seek only maximization of profits are less likely
to invest in these types of ventures because their corporate
216
goals diverge.
Investors in benefit corporations and other social enterprises are part of the socially responsible investing (SRI)
movement, which has grown over the past thirty years to represent almost ten percent of the United States’ assets under
217
management, or roughly $6.2 trillion dollars. According to the
United States Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, in the year 2014, socially responsible investors invested
218
$4.85 trillion dollars. J.P. Morgan estimates the ten-year
profit potential from these opportunities alone ranges between
219
$183 billion and $667 billion dollars. Although the benefit
corporation is a new entity, the success of a reputable company
similar to Patagonia, which has doubled in size and tripled its
220
profits since 2008, suggests that benefit corporations may be
221
a good investment opportunity and will attract investors.
n.221 (2010) (explaining that empirical studies have revealed a positive correlation between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance). Stock in “responsible” companies is effectively a “composite financial
product[ ]—a bundle that blends an investment vehicle together with a charitable giving vehicle.” Joshua Graff Zivin & Arthur Small, A Modigliani-Miller
Theory of Altruistic Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS
& POL’Y, no.1, 2005, at 2. Shareholders buy into “responsible” corporations because they value both the economic return and the “charitable return” or
“warm glow” they feel after contributing to the firm’s non-profit initiative. Id.
216. See Kristin A. Neubauer, Benefit Corporations: Providing a New
Shield for Corporations with Ideals Beyond Profits, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 109,
126 (2016).
217. US SIF FOUND., REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 12 (2014), http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/
SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf. SRI has evolved in both the public and private markets, becoming an institutionalized sector of the professional asset management market and giving rise to a distinct venture capital and private equity
industry of funds and individual investors seeking values-aligned investment
opportunities. Id. But see Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 213, at 657 (stating that even those who advocate for “socially responsible investments” concede that many socially conscious investors still invest with the primary goal
of making a return).
218. See Sustainable and Impact Investing in the United States Overview,
US SIF, http://www.ussif.org/photogallery/infographics1.jpg (last visited Mar.
6, 2017).
219. Nick O’Donohoe et al., Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class,
J.P. MORGAN (Nov. 29, 2010), https://thegiin.org/knowledge/publication/impact
-investments-an-emerging-asset-class.
220. See Drake Baer, How Patagonia’s New CEO Is Increasing Profits
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There may still be a concern about whether investors will
invest in the type of benefit corporation suggested in this Note:
prioritizing the specific public benefit, with an optional general
public benefit. However, it is likely investors will still invest as
much in these benefit corporations as the specific benefit corporations already created. By providing notice of the prioritized
specific public benefit to investors, benefit corporations are in a
better position to attract the types of investors who share their
222
interests in philanthropic endeavors. With the many invest223
ments made in benefit corporations thus far, it is likely investors will also invest in the benefit corporations formed under
the proposed statute.
CONCLUSION
Fiduciary duties in benefit corporations ensure director accountability through two approaches. One is to deter and sanction directors who do not accomplish their purpose within the
benefit corporation, and the second is to guide directors who
work steadfastly towards accomplishing their purpose with the
224
help of standards and guidance. Directors can lead these corporations to successfully fulfill the social good and positively
impact the society. However, given the lack of guidance or clarity of director duty within current statutes, directors may face
moral challenges and difficult decisions when considering
stakeholder interests. When lawsuits are brought against benefit corporations, courts will provide guidance for best practices
for directors over time. Nonetheless, clarity of director duties is
needed now to provide guidance when interests conflict. Benefit
225
corporations propose to “do good while still doing well”; clear
guidance for directors can help corporations accomplish these
dual purposes.
Because the current benefit corporation statutes lack clear
guidance for director duty, reform thus requires benefit corpo-

While Trying To Save the World, FAST COMP. (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www
.fastcompany.com/3026713/lessons-learned/how-patagonias-new-ceo-is
-increasing-profits-while-trying-to-save-the-world.
221. Shealy, supra note 18, at 715.
222. Neubauer, supra note 216, at 124.
223. Kyle Westaway, Benefit Corporations: Can Investors Have Their Cake
and Eat It Too?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.theguardian
.com/sustainable-business/benefit-corporations-sustainability-investors.
224. McDonnell, supra note 162, at 71.
225. Id. at 72.
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rations to have a prioritized, specific public benefit with an optional general public benefit. The proposed statute requires a
specific public benefit purpose that places an emphasis on one
identified cause. This mandate gives directors the ability to focus on their single, unique benefit without having to struggle to
consider a list of vague stakeholder interests. This focus will
help eliminate the lack of clarity that currently impedes director decision-making in current benefit corporation legislation.
The opt-in provision for the general public benefit allows social
entrepreneurs to retain the “triple bottom line” as the main
purpose behind their benefit corporation if they choose. In sum,
the proposed statute provides directors with the confidence to
make decisions while providing consumers and investors with
the assurance that directors will be held accountable for corporate actions.

